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Always in Control? 
Sovereign States in Cyberspace    
Sarah Mainwaring 
  
 
Abstract   
For well over 20 years, we have witnessed an intriguing debate about the nature of cyberspace. Used for 
everything from communication to commerce, it has transformed the way individuals and societies live. But how 
has it impacted the sovereignty of states? An initial wave of scholars argued that it had dramatically diminished 
centralised control by states, helped by a tidal wave of globalisation and freedom. These libertarian claims were 
considerable. More recently, a new wave of writing has argued that states have begun to recover control in 
cyberspace, focusing on either the police work of authoritarian regimes or the revelations of Edward Snowden. 
Both claims were wide of the mark. By contrast, this article argues that we have often misunderstood the 
materiality of cyberspace and its consequences for control. It not only challenges the libertarian narrative of 
freedom, it suggests that the anarchic imaginary of the internet as a ‘Wild West’ was deliberately promoted by 
states in order to distract from the reality. The internet, like previous forms of electronic connectivity, consists 
mostly of a physical infrastructure located in specific geographies and jurisdictions. Rather than circumscribing 
sovereignty, it has offered centralised authority new ways of conducting statecraft. Indeed, the internet, high-
speed computing and voice recognition were all the result of security research by a single information hegemon 
and therefore it has always been in control.  
 
Key Words: cyberspace; boundaries; power; sovereignty; surveillance; USA.  
 
 
Introduction  
Cyberspace is now ubiquitous. Carrying most of our communications, accelerating commerce, 
increasingly connecting our toasters and toothbrushes, it is transforming the way individuals and 
societies operate. Long understood as a place of enhanced individual freedom, a romantic vision of this 
‘space’ still dominates many popular imaginaries. Often framed as metaphorical ‘Wild West’, 
cyberspace became understood as a place in which authority, boundaries and geography were weak or 
even did not apply. While attractive, this understanding of cyberspace is misplaced. The libertarian 
understanding of cyberspace has failed to grasp the extent to which sovereign states historically 
developed the internet for their strategic advantage. Consequently, more recent attempts by states like 
Russia and China to assert control or influence over cyberspace are misunderstood as individual, 
isolated attempts by authoritarian states to master the internet. Rather than anomalies, this article 
suggests that the long-standing appetite of sovereign states to assert power over and through cyberspace 
stretches back to the Second World War. More importantly, we should question whether this 
misunderstanding has not been convenient for governments, enabling them to defend their surveillance 
practices as an attempt to assert order in a supposedly anarchic space. Tracing the historical trajectory 
of these developments, the current debate about the ‘weaponization of cyberspace’ is recast. Rather than 
a special place from which the ‘weary giants’ of government were excluded, it was simply an extension 
of their security activities. The image of cyberspace has been constructed in a way that has misdirected 
our understanding of the nature of communications technology.  
It is not surprising that cyberspace was romantically imagined as a boundless space of freedom. 
The term was invented in 1984 by the writer William Gibson in the context of his novel ‘Neuromancer’ 
which speaks eloquently of a different ‘kind’ of space, ‘a consensual hallucination experienced daily 
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by billions… in every nation.’ Emphasising the novelty of a ‘space’ in which individuals and 
communities could connect beyond traditional (State) mechanisms of control and governance, this 
‘space’ was framed through meta-level metaphors, eagerly seized upon by libertarians throughout the 
1990s. Perhaps the most famous of these was John Perry Barlow, American poet, cattle rancher, privacy 
campaigner and lyricist for the Grateful Dead. Responding to the US governments attempts to censor 
the internet in 1996, he issued a declaration of independence for cyberspace, dismissing states as the 
‘weary giants of flesh and steel.’1 Barlow’s influential language was distinctly utopian and has echoed 
down the decades. Typically, in 2011, Nicholas Negroponte, creator of Wired magazine observed: ‘this 
is just the beginning, the beginning of understanding that cyberspace has no limits, no boundaries.’ By 
equal turns, some of this discussion is disturbingly dystopian. Eric Schmidt, long-standing chairman of 
Google, warns us that: ‘The Internet is the first thing that humanity has built that humanity doesn't 
understand, the largest experiment in anarchy that we have ever had.’2  But what all these narratives 
have in common is a sense of anarchy and a distinct underappreciation of the ongoing processes by 
which states are making this space. By contrast, I argue here that the widely accepted libertarian vision 
of cyberspace has often been convenient, enabling states to conjure up a vision of cyberspace as an 
untamed ‘Wild West’ of criminality and rebellion in order to legitimate their security activities.  This, 
in turn, raises the bigger question of whether Governments have enabled or encouraged us to 
misunderstand cyberspace, casting a cloak of obscurity over their activities.  
The majority of current accounts within International Relations remain somewhat deterministic, 
offering ahistorical and non-materialist approaches in which the internet simply accelerates the 
corrosive effects of globalisation in eroding the authority of the state.3 As Geoffrey Herrera observed, 
much of the literature on this subject understands the internet as, at best, a simple accelerator of 
globalisation and at worst a threat to the future of the nation-state system.4 Herrera, one of the few 
International Relations scholars to reflect at length on this subject, argues that writing about the internet 
often takes the form of a technological determinism  that is ‘vastly at odds’ with the historical record.5 
This article extends Herrera’s significant critique, highlighting the ways in which sovereign states have 
shaped the development of cyberspace. In particular, it challenges the ‘placeless-ness’ narrative, 
emphasising the importance of the material, physical and historical dimensions of these technologies 
together with the control this affords.6  
This effort to recast our understanding of cyberspace draws on the ideas of French philosopher, 
Henri Lefebvre. Writing in the 1960s, in response to the urban planning of French cities, Lefebvre 
critiqued the way space was understood as scientific, objective and pure. His celebrated text ‘The Social 
Production of Space’ changed how space was understood, introducing politics and society to 
geographical analysis. Created through social relations, he argued that space should be understood as a 
process. Consequently, researchers and geographers had to think about why space was created, not just 
                                                          
1 John Perry Barlow, ‘A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace’, Electronic Frontier Foundation, 
available at: {https://www.eff.org/cyberspace-independence} accessed 1st October 2019  
2 Jerome Taylor, ‘Google Chief: My Fears for Generation Facebook.’ Independent, 22 October 2011. Available 
at: {http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/google-chief-my-fears-for-generation-
facebook-2055390.html.} Accessed 27th November 2018.  
3 See for example Kevin Robins, ‘Cyberspace and the world we live in’, Body & Society, 1:3-4 (1995), pp.135-
155; Martin Dodge and Rob Kitchin, Mapping cyberspace (London: Routledge, 2003); Christian Fuchs, Internet 
and society: Social theory in the information age (London: Routledge, 2007). 
4 See for example Ryan Henry and Edward Peartree, ‘The Information Revolution and International Security’ 
(Washington, CISI, 1998); Ronald Deibert, ‘Circuits of Power: Security in the Internet Environment’, in J. 
Rosenau and J.P. Singh (eds.), Information Technologies and Global Politics: The Changing Scope of Power 
and Governance (New York: SUNY, 2002), pp.115–42; Robert Latham, Bombs and Bandwidth: The Emerging 
Relationship Between IT and Security (New York: The New Press, 2003); Yale Ferguson and Richard 
Mansbach, Remapping Global Politics: History’s Revenge and Future Shock (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004). 
5 Geoffrey Herrera, ‘Cyberspace and sovereignty: thoughts on physical space and digital space’, in Myriam 
Dunn Cavelty and Victor Mauer (eds.), Power and Security in the Information Age: Investigating the Role of the 
State in Cyberspace (London: Routledge, 2016), pp.81-108. 
6 Ibid. See also Geoffrey Herrera, Technology and international transformation: The railroad, the atom bomb, 
and the politics of technological change (New York: SUNY Press, 2012). 
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what was ‘in’ it.7 Underlying the politics of space, he was at pains to emphasise the way cities and urban 
planning were the products of history, politics and social relations, rather than simply ‘natural space’.8 
In many ways, cyberspace is not dissimilar to the 1960s French urbanism that sparked Lefebvre’s ideas. 
Originating in the American defence industry, cyberspace has evolved in ways that fit remarkably well 
onto the map of Westphalian sovereign states. Governments of all kinds have produced cyberspace for 
their strategic advantage. In Lefebvre’s language, cyberspace ‘is also a means of control, and hence of 
domination, of power.9 This article seeks to explore the diverse and often conflicting ways states have 
seen and used cyberspace in this way.  
Lefebvre’s ideas were further developed by Doreen Massey’s writings on globalisation.10 
Critiquing many of the abstracted and utopian notions of globalisation, she pointed out that it ‘doesn’t 
float above the earth, it is operated by the same material, social, embedded processes of people in branch 
plants, in production factories, in research organisations, making decisions which may or may not work 
out all around the world.’11 Similar observations might be made about cyberspace which has also been 
described as a floating cloud or libertarian tool of freedom that has reduced governmental power and 
authority. This space did not emerge organically but is the product of interrelations, ‘constituted through 
interactions, from the immensity of the global to the intimately tiny.’12  Moreover, viewed as a product 
of fluid, ongoing relations, the idea that cyberspace has arrived as a complete entity is also challenged 
in favour of a continuum.  
Unsurprisingly, geographers have been consistently important in urging us to appreciate the 
importance of territory as a process.13 Most prominently, Gerard O Tuathail argues that cyberspace, 
much like the contemporary world financial system ‘is not the product of natural forces… but of a new 
working relationship between States and markets promoted, in part, by the States themselves… 
geography is not so much disappearing as being restructured, rearranged and rewired.’14 Importantly, 
he suggests that our misunderstanding of cyber is part of an attempt to ‘denaturalise and limit the power 
of States while naturalising the virtues of the markets.’15  
The possibility that this new ‘space’ enhances state power through surveillance is critically 
important, and is largely overlooked within the libertarian consensus.16 The debate over the role of 
communications technologies and the Arab Spring typifies this narrative. 17 Initially, these events were 
hailed as evidence of the transformative impact of telecommunications technology across North Africa 
and the Middle East. Typically, Howard and Hussain suggested that this ‘space’ created through Social 
Media and other platforms represents a substantive shift from historical mechanisms of social 
governance and ordering. Reducing entry costs of traditional forms of heavily regulated media like 
                                                          
7 Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space (London: Wiley-Blackwell, 1991)  
8 Henri Lefebvre, ‘Reflections on the Politics of Space,’ Antipode, 8:1 (1976), p. 31  
9 Lefebvre, The Production of Space, p. 26. 
10 Doreen Massey, for space (London: Sage, 2005).  
11 Doreen Massey, Power Geometries and the Politics of Space-Time (Heidelberg: University of Heidelberg 
Press, 1999), p.50 
12 Massey, for space, p.9 
13 Juliet J. Fall, ‘Artificial States? On the enduring geographical myth of natural borders,’ Political Geography, 
29:2 (2010), pp.140-47. 
14 Gearoid O Tuathail, ‘Borderless worlds? Problematising discourses of de-territorialisation,’ Geopolitics, 4:2 
(1999), pp.139-154. 
15 Ibid., p.147. 
16 Our conception of state power and surveillance derives from David Lyon, Surveillance Society: Monitoring 
Everyday Life (London: McGraw-Hill, 2001). 
17 Naila Hamdy and Ehab Gomaa. ‘Framing the Egyptian uprising in Arabic language newspapers and social 
media,’ Journal of Communication, 62: 2 (2012), 195-211; Sahar Khamis, Paul B. Gold, and Katherine Vaughn, 
‘Beyond Egypt’s “Facebook Revolution” and Syria’s “YouTube Uprising:” Comparing Political Contexts, 
Actors and Communication Strategies,’ Arab Media & Society, 15:1 (2012); S. Khamis, & K. Vaughn, ‘We Are 
All Khaled Said: The potentials and limitations of cyberactivism in triggering public mobilization and 
promoting political change’, Journal of Arab & Muslim Media Research, 4:1 (2012), 145-163; M. Nanabhay & 
R. Farmanfarmaian, ‘From spectacle to spectacular: How physical space, social media and mainstream 
broadcast amplified the public sphere in Egypt’s revolution,’ Journal of North African Studies, 16:4 (2011), 
573-605. 
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television commercials or radio channels, social movements were liberated through both ubiquity and 
anonymity. ‘When physical spaces for public conversation and debate closed down,’ they argue, ‘the 
Internet provided virtual spaces for political communication.’18 Cyberspace was framed as empowering 
social movements and dissenting individuals, providing an alternative space that facilitates freedom of 
expression or association.19  
More recently, scholars have revised their view in two ways. First, they have become more 
sceptical about the role of social media in generating the Arab Spring and, secondly, they have argued 
that states have since become more adept at controlling it.20 Slowly but surely, they have moved in the 
direction of the iconoclastic technology critic Evgeny Mozrov, accepting that authoritarian states like 
China have successfully countered Google and built their own local intranet or ‘splinternet.21 But even 
this narrative is incorrect, overlooking the significant ways in which sovereign states in the liberal 
democratic sphere have consistently exerted control and authority over these technologies, albeit in 
more hidden ways.  
Indeed, surveillance experts have now begun to speak of a sinister innovation called ‘social 
media intelligence’. David Omand, a former Director of GCHQ and Carl Miller of DEMOS have 
sketched out a whole new terrain of state-driven forecasting activity that draws on data from things like 
twitterfeed. Social media intelligence (SOCMINT) includes a range of techniques and technologies that 
facilitate the watching of social media networking sites such as Facebook or Twitter. Although this has 
been around for many years, typically with police analysts scanning protester chat rooms, the move is 
towards using bigger data for spotting trends and undertaking sentiment analysis. The result is 
something that hovers in the liminal space between intelligence and behavioural social science, offering 
the holy grail of predicting future political events. The way in which social media, once seen as a voice 
from below, has become the latest intelligence tool for those watching from above, is perhaps indicative 
of the direction of travel.22 
Ultimately, cyberspace has transformed how we might understand future governance. Rather 
than signalling the decline of the importance of Westphalian States, it has enabled sovereign power to 
evolve, creating new means of governance and reinforcing centralised power and authority in significant 
ways. All of these realities are lost in the romantic vision of cyberspace as a libertarian playground of 
de-territorialised freedom. Emphasising the historic and enduring importance of sovereign authority to 
cyberspace recovers its intrinsically material, territorial, and state-based origins that can be fortified, 
not challenged, under globalizing conditions. The underlying physical infrastructure of Cyberspace is 
important not just because it is based on physical lands or ran by people. It is important because States 
have been able to use these physical components to control and exert influence through this ‘space.’ In 
an age of nation-state hacking and grand disinformation campaigns, the willingness of states to exploit 
cyberspace shows little sign of abating. We perhaps need a stronger appreciation of the long history of 
these tendencies, finally appreciating the true scale and impact of states in cyberspace. At root, as 
Lefebvre suggests, it ‘is not a scientific object removed from ideology or politics; it has always been 
political and strategic.’23   
 
 
Materiality 
Perhaps the most fundamental way cyberspace has been used by states is one of the most well-hidden. 
Lost within a romantic understanding of cyberspace as a ‘mysterious world,’ we overlook the way 
                                                          
18 Philip Howard & Muzammil Hussain ‘Democracy’s Fourth Wave? Digital Media and The Arab Spring 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), p.5. 
19 Nevertheless, there is quite a lot of work on how state bordering practices for example Louise Amoore, The 
politics of possibility: Risk and security beyond probability (Duke University Press, 2013); Louise Amoore, 
‘Algorithmic war: Everyday geographies of the War on Terror,’ Antipode 41:1 (2009) pp.49-69. 
20  C. Byun, & E.J. Hollander, 'Explaining the intensity of the Arab Spring', Digest of Middle East Studies, 24: 1 
(2015), 26–46; A. Smidi & Saif Shahin, 'Social Media and Social Mobilisation the Middle East: A Survey of 
Research on the Arab Spring, India Quarterly, 73: 2 (2017) pp.196-209. 
21 Michael Meyer, Evgeny vs. the internet', Columbia Journalism Review, Jan/Feb 2014. 
22 David Omand, Jamie Bartlett, and Carl Miller, ‘Introducing social media intelligence (SOCMINT),’ 
Intelligence and National Security, 27:6 (2012), 801-823. 
23 Henri Lefebvre, ‘Reflections on The Politics of Space,’ Antipode, 8:1 (1976), p.31 
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cyberspace has been constructed and designed by state authorities. Hidden in plain sight, the physicality 
and infrastructure of cyberspace remains attached to and reliant upon a physical territory. This enables 
States to control and influence these electronic environments, often for their advantage. While the view 
of figures like Dan Hunter who see cyberspace as a ‘global commons’24 is attractive, it overlooks the 
significance of these physical and geographical dimensions. It is to these, perhaps mundane aspects of 
cyberspace, that this article now turns. Echoing Mark Graham, we must recognise that cyberspace is 
not an ‘abstract space or digital global village’ but a constructed network or system of information 
exchange. Sovereign authorities are central to this construction, often making some of the most 
important decisions about its location and design. Despite perceptions of the internet as a global 
commons and public good, the internet has been constructed along geographical lines that are 
remarkably congruent with established borders and boundaries. Consequently, we need an alternate, 
nuanced and more ‘spatially grounded’ way of understanding how cyberspace has developed over 
time.25 
Why are the physical or territorial components of cyberspace are so frequently overlooked? 
The most persistent users of misleading meta-level metaphors are Presidents and Prime Ministers. Their 
purpose is to frame threat complexities in terms of an unruly environment that is imperfectly policed 
and beyond law and order. On 28 March 2018, UK leader Theresa May, outlining her new National 
Cyber Security Strategy, was at pains to draw a distinction ‘between the cyber and physical worlds’, 
while a week before, her Secretary of State with responsibility for this area, Matt Hancock, unveiled 
new regulations for electronic commerce as heralding a future in which the internet would cease to be 
the ‘Wild West’.26 Similarly, in 2016, Obama deployed almost the same language at the G-20 Summit 
in Hangzhou, China, insisting that ‘we cannot have a situation where this “space” becomes the Wild 
Wild West’, and calling for measures that would enable greater surveillance and offensive capabilities 
within this domain.27 Despite their frequency, these statements have a negative consequence, obscuring 
the very real, significant dependencies of this environment on physical attributes and control.  
 Recently, the Tongan population experienced this physicality. In January 2019, an undersea 
fibre optic cable connecting Tonga to the internet through the Indian Ocean was damaged. Risking the 
population’s communications, healthcare and labour market, the event forced Tonga to rely on one 
single satellite dish for its communications and national infrastructure. The satellite link offered less 
than one per cent of the capacity offered by the severed cable and the result was a huge disruption. Tom 
Westbrook of Reuters reported that the incident was ‘throwing communications across the tiny and 
isolated country into chaos.’28 Most strikingly, reports indicated how it ‘prompted hundreds of people 
to queue outside a government telecom office where the signal is most reliable… hours have been 
extended to midnight to handle crowds of officials, business people and ordinary folk logging on to 
access cash remittances, buy plane tickets and chat.’29  
Few internet users pause to consider the journey their data takes between each transaction. A 
mere 400 fibre optic cables carry 99% of transoceanic data, comprising ‘the physical links that bind our 
digital world together.’30 The mode of transport is undersea cables that look rather like garden 
hosepipes, laid down by specialist ships across the bottom of the ocean. Far removed from images of 
                                                          
24 Dan Hunter, ‘Cyberspace as Place and the Tragedy of the Digital Anti-commons’, in Paul Schiff Berman (ed.) 
Law and Society Approaches to Cyberspace (London: Routledge, 2017), pp.59-139.  
25 Mark Graham, ‘Geography/internet: ethereal alternate dimensions of cyberspace or grounded augmented 
realities?’, The Geographical Journal, 179:2 (2013), pp.177-182. 
26 Chris Baynes, 'New laws to tackle “Wild West” internet will make UK “safest place in the world” to be 
online, Matt Hancock claims', Independent, 20 May 2018. 
27 Nick Allen, 2016, 'Barack Obama warns of Cold War-style “cyber arms race” with Russia’, Telegraph, 5 
September 2016. Available at: (https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/09/05/barack-obama-warns-of-cold-
war-style-cyber-arms-race-with-russia/ ) Accessed 2nd April 2019.  
28 Tom Westbrook. ‘Severed Cable Sends Tonga ‘Back to Beginning of the Internet.’ , Reuters , 23rd January 
2019 Available at: (https://www.reuters.com/article/us-tonga-internet/severed-cable-sends-tonga-back-to-
beginning-of-the-internet-idUSKCN1PI0A8 ) Accessed 2nd April 2019  
29 Westbrook. ‘Severed Cable Sends Tonga ‘Back to Beginning of the Internet’. 
30 Garrett Hinck, ‘Cutting the Cord: The Legal Regime Protecting Undersea Cables.’ Lawfare Blog. November 
2017. Available at (https://www.lawfareblog.com/cutting-cord-legal-regime-protecting-undersea-cables ) 
Accessed 2nd April 2019 
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ethereal ‘clouds’ void of physical territory, these cables of glass and metal form the backbone of the 
internet and they are often strangely fragile. Alexandra Chang of Wired magazine observed how ‘they 
are for the most part poorly armoured, rarely patrolled and only occasionally monitored.’31 Andrew 
Blum, the author of Tubes, a fascinating archaeological journey to the centre of the internet, also finds 
their vulnerability rather remarkable.32  
A further striking example of our misunderstanding of cyberspace is the idea of the ‘Cloud’.33 
This an example of the problem of using metaphors and grand statements to describe an industrial 
mixture of server farms, data warehouses and software as service.34 Obscured through an image of our 
data being transported into a ‘cloud’ above us, instead the industrial skeleton of cyberspace exists in the 
forms of fibre optic cables, metal pylons and satellite dishes, human resource and water supplies. In 
fact, the industrial skeleton of cyberspace continues to exist in the form of miles of fibre optic cables, 
metal pylons and satellite dishes, together with server farms in vast metal sheds that demand 
considerable amounts of water and electricity.35 One of the largest is the Next Generation Data Europe 
centre in Newport, Europe’s major data centre facility. Over 19,000 server cabinets plus storage are 
displaced across three floors that cover 750,000 square feet and - while impressive - it has little 
resemblance to a cloud.36  
Discussing examples of this infrastructure uncovers the rather mundane ways cyberspace is 
governed and maintained in the 21st century.  Many geographers have commented on this hidden aspect 
of cyberspace, but few have speculated as to the rationale. From the perspective of the everyday user, 
they are seemingly happy that the wiring is hidden behind and beneath user interfaces. Shannon Mattern 
explores this idea, suggesting that it is easy to forget ‘how they delimit our agency and how they are 
defining the terrain we are interfacing with.’37  Extending this idea of the physicality of cyberspace, 
Louise Amoore reminds us that ‘as computer science began to document the emergence of cloud 
computing, geography came to have a specific meaning, defined by where data and programs are 
spatially stored.’38 DeNardis, similarly reminds us that, ‘root servers are housed in buildings and run by 
people.’39 But what does this tell us about the power of states and corporations? 
Rather than being unbridled or organic, we need to recognise that ‘at the core of the internet is 
a series of components that are infrastructural: internet exchanges, national backbone networks, regional 
networks and local networks.’40 As Saskia Sassen suggests, we should recognise that the digital 
networks of cyberspace are not only comprised of hardware and software but societal structures and 
power dynamics that also have considerable materiality: ‘There is no purely digital economy, just as 
there is no virtual corporation or community.’41 Connections between the ‘real’ and ‘cyber’ worlds are 
all around us, located under pavements and along motorway pylons. Hidden in plain sight, these 
infrastructure layers clearly demonstrate both the physicality of cyberspace and its connections with 
sovereign territories.  
Simultaneously, they highlight connections between cyberspace and ‘old industrial cities’ as 
centres of power, traditionally associated with sovereign control. Graham writes forcibly on this, 
                                                          
31 Alexandra Chang. ‘Why Undersea Cables are More Vulnerable than You Think.’ Wired Magazine. 2nd April 
2013. Available at: ( https://www.wired.com/2013/04/how-vulnerable-are-undersea-internet-cables/ ) Accessed 
2nd April 2019 
32 Andrew Blum, Tubes: A Journey to the Center of the Internet (New York: Ecco, 2012). 
33 Paul Jaeger, Jimmy Lin, and Justin Grimes, Cloud computing and information policy: Computing in a policy 
cloud?’ Journal of Information Technology & Politics, 5:3 (2008), pp.269-83. 
34 Rajkumar Buyya, et al., ‘Cloud computing and emerging IT platforms: Vision, hype, and reality for delivering 
computing as the 5th utility,’ Future Generation computer systems, 25:6 (2009), pp.599-616. 
35 Amoore, ‘Cloud Geographies,’ p.5. 
36 Philip Stafford, ‘Next Generation Data explores listing’, Financial Times, 28 June 2010. 
37 Shannon Mattern, ‘Interfacing Urban Intelligence,’ in Rob Kitchin, Sung-Yueh Perng (eds.) Code and The 
City. (London: Routledge, 2016), pp.49-60. 
38 Louise Amoore, ‘Cloud Geographies: Computing, Data, Sovereignty’, Progress in Human Geography, 42:1 
(2018) pp.4-24. 
39 Laura DeNardis. ‘The Internet Design Tension between Surveillance and Security,’ IEEE Annals of the 
History of Computing. 37:2 (2015), pp.72-83  
40 Sassen, Territory, Authority, Rights, p.330 
41 Ibid. p. 341 
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arguing that the reliance on metaphors obfuscates ‘complex relations between new communications and 
information technologies and space, place and society’. Rather than developing organically and 
sporadically, the concentration of ‘virtual cities’ within metropolitan cities of New York and London 
(for example) are used to demonstrate that, as with television, radio and printing technologies, ‘any 
cursory examination of the Internet and the World Wide Web shows that much of the traffic represents 
and articulates real places and spaces.’42 Thus, not only is cyberspace socially constructed and 
contingent, it is created and implemented for specific uses and needs, notably ‘the very cultural roots 
of modern capitalist society.’43 Social scientists might give more weight to these connections, 
understanding cyberspace within its social, political and historical context. Seen through the lens of 
Victorian industrialism, cyberspace becomes viewed as the latest social technology, impacting society 
in similar ways that the steam-engine and teleprinter did before. 
Lawyers have been quicker than many to identify the physical and historical connections 
between internet technology and sovereignty, often viewing these things through the prisms of 
ownership or jurisdiction. Mark Lemley is one example, offering a typically materialist prescription, 
arguing that no-one is ‘in’ cyberspace. The internet, he suggests, is merely a protocol, a piece of code 
that permits computer users to transmit data between their computers using existing communications 
networks. There were computer networks before the internet that similarly relied on telephonic 
exchange of data.44 By emphasising historic connections between the telegram, the television and 
telecommunication, Lemley directly questions the validity of viewing cyberspace as a mysterious and 
separate world when similar approaches to the telegram and television are absent: ‘People may speak 
occasionally of being ‘lost in’ or ‘transported’ by a television show, a movie, or even a book, but we 
hardly surrender our understanding that ‘television space’ is merely a series of images transmitted to 
us.’45   
Understood as both physical infrastructure and social relations, cyberspace is, as Stanley Brunn 
argues, transforming the nature of states and what it means to have power in the 21st century, but not 
displacing them.46 Rather than being void of physical or political territory, global networks are the 
product and reproduction of political, historical and social relations. Within these networks, geography 
and place remain important, embedded this infrastructure within sovereign parameters. We thus need 
to challenge Steven Spiegel’s claims that the post-Cold-War era was one characterised by the 
‘diminishing role of geography.’47 While the last twenty years have undoubtedly been characterised by 
globalised communications and the oft-celebrated ‘information revolution,’48 sovereignty and physical 
territory remain important.  
 Within this new context, sovereignty and state authority is changed, not erased. Travelling and 
existing between diverse infrastructural ‘layers,’ power and governance are transformed. Those seeking 
to find a useful mezzanine between the ethereal, the cultural or physical have been attracted to the idea 
of layers. Klimburg suggests a four-layer model that incorporates i) the physical or hardware layer; ii) 
the logic layer (code); iii) the data layer (photographs, e-mails, data); and iv) the social layer. But he 
adds that in reality, the internet resembles the telephone systems from which it grew: ‘the backbone of 
the Internet is made of cables that run across continents and under the seas, with a smattering of satellite 
links as well.’49 Bratton’s much-discussed analysis simply extends Klimburg’s idea further, exploring 
the six layers of “The Stack”, independent but intrinsically connected: Earth, Cloud, City, Address, 
Interface and user.50  
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Importantly, both models emphasise the relationship between sovereign authority, electronic 
networks and physical infrastructure. Simply put – they highlight the connections between the 
‘electronic’ and ‘physical’ worlds. This is important, adding further weight to the challenge this article 
poses to the libertarian understanding of cyberspace. Less romantic and attractive than mystery, 
cyberspace is composed of cables, data centres, protocols, energy supply, buildings and people. At once 
physical and electronic, these layers combine to create what Bratton terms ‘new spaces in its own 
imaginary: clouds, networks, zones, social graphs, ecologies, megacities, formal and informal violence, 
weird theologies, all imposed on the other.’51 Sovereign authority exists within this new environment, 
adapting and responding to changes around it.  
 
 
State sovereignty and national boundedness  
The dexterity this physical infrastructure affords sovereign states is not insignificant. Building and 
expanding particular networks, governments have been remarkably adept at shaping the form and nature 
of cyberspace for strategic or political ends. China is perhaps the most widely discussed, famously 
constructing her ‘Great Firewall of China’ to advance the country’s comprehensive censorship system.52 
The manner in which China was able to vanquish Google and now appears to be able to defeat even 
complex anonymising software for browsing the web underlines the degree of control. Recent 
revelations of possible connections between Huawei and the Chinese Government are seen by some as 
the latest in a series of efforts to control and influence this so-called ‘fluid’ space.53 These events, 
however, are often incorrectly viewed by the libertarian narrative in isolation. Rather than single events 
or attempts by particular ‘rogue’ states to subvert the existing status quo, this is perhaps indicative of a 
widespread appetite and ability of states across the globe to extend their authority by working together. 
Typically, the cybersecurity treaty signed by China and Russia in 2015 which was largely about 
containing threats from dissident elements.54 
The weaponization of cyberspace for strategic advantage is perhaps the clearest example of this 
trend. Sitting awkwardly with acclamations of the untamed ‘Wild West’ by premiers, is emerging 
evidence of advanced states intentionally harvesting the power of cyberspace for their military and 
political advantage. We perhaps need to pay far more attention to these examples. This use of offensive 
measures in this context is something that many government officials have been rather anxious to avoid 
discussing, and have therefore only recently surfaced in the academic literature. Yet it is now clear that 
these practices actually began during the 1980s, suggesting that the US National Security Council 
mapped a geostrategic mindset from the surveillance leviathans of the Cold War directly into cyber-
space.55   
In May 2017, the world received a sudden reminder of the dangers of cyberspace in the form 
of the WannaCry ransomware attack. This was a global cyberattack by crypto-worm, a self-propagating 
virus, which focused on computers running the Microsoft Windows operating system. It worked by 
encrypting data and demanding ransom payments in the Bitcoin cryptocurrency in return for the release 
of the data. Although Microsoft had released updates to close the vulnerability, WannaCry continued 
to spread amongst organizations that had not updated their computers, or who were using Windows 
systems that were no longer supported. Although Microsoft released further emergency patches, 
Wannacry was mostly stopped because of the chance discovery of a kill switch that prevented it from 
spreading. Impacting some 200,000 computers across 150 countries, and with costs estimated in the 
billions of dollars, security experts pointed to North Korea or agencies working for the country, as the 
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culprit.56 In December 2017, the United States, United Kingdom and Australia formally asserted that 
North Korea was behind the attack.57 
 With no immediately identifiable author, the attack appeared to validate the Wild West view of 
a libertarian cyber-space, inhabited by criminals and paedophiles, a world in which States were weak 
and losing control. The subsequent attribution to North Korea only seemed to underline the idea of 
rogue actors. However, over time a rather different story emerged that pointed instead to the world’s 
information hegemon and underlines how organisations like America’s NSA and Britain’s GCHQ work 
to maintain information supremacy. Although the press initially suggested that Wannacry was 
‘released’ by an individual hacker, and then blamed North Korea, in fact, the North Korean hackers 
were mere middlemen. WannaCry was built around an exploit called EternalBlue, developed by the 
codebreakers of the United States National Security Agency (NSA) for older Windows systems. 
EternalBlue was then stolen and leaked by a group called ‘The Shadow Brokers’ a few months before 
the attack. As Amy Zegart, Stanford University’s top intelligence expert has argued, this was a problem 
of NSA’s own making. In other words, the wildest part of the Wild West was actually being developed 
by the most powerful government in the world to attack other governments.58 
Statements by Microsoft officials hint at the possibility that both Microsoft and the NSA were 
aware that this electronic weapon had been leaked, producing a ‘patch’ or ‘cure’ for systems through 
updates in March 2017, perhaps explaining why many of the systems successfully targeted were running 
old software that had not been updated, notably the UK National Health Service computer systems.59 
This not only demonstrates the curious power relations that exist in cyberspace, it also reminds us that 
sovereign states remain central to the stability or instability of the internet, working ‘behind the screens’ 
of the average computer user scrolling through their social media. This apparently ‘uncontrollable 
space’ remains commanded by traditional ‘weary giants’, at least in terms of the exclusive ability to 
manufacture advanced persistent threats.60  
Accordingly, President of Microsoft, Brad Smith, has been vocal about states in cyberspace. 
He used the Wannacry attack to argue that sovereign entities and their territories enjoy too much power, 
not too little. If there was a potential for chaos on the internet, it lay not with drug dealers prowling the 
dark web but with the military-intelligence complex: ‘Governments of the world should treat this attack 
as a wake-up call. This attack provides yet another example of why the stockpiling of vulnerabilities by 
governments is such a problem.’61 In 2017, speaking at RSA, the world’s most important internet 
security conference, he outlined his ideas for a Digital Geneva Convention focused on restricting what 
he called the growing problem of electronic attacks by states on citizens in times of peace. While the 
issue of precise nature of the partnerships between government and industry in the development of 
‘Cyber-vulnerabilities’ is beyond the scope of this paper, this episode is a clear example of states using 
cyberspace as a tool of statecraft. It also alludes to a broader question of liability, raising the possibility 
that courts may find states to be both the source and the legally culpable body for some attacks, 
ultimately paying compensation to corporations and citizens. The fact that the CIA appointed an 
experienced lawyer in 2008 to consider legal liabilities arising from its cyberwarfare and information 
programmes underlines the fact that these activities have become routine for the United States for quite 
some time.62  
The United States is not the only country that has dissembled. For decades, the more powerful 
governments have framed cyberspace through the anarchic language of the ‘dark web,’ justifying 
measures that allow them to further extend their control. The Indian Government is one example. 
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Crafting an image of this environment as an uncontrollable ‘dark place,’63 draconian encryption policies 
were justified in 2015, pressuring internet companies to share access to encrypted data with law 
enforcement agencies. Echoing similar accusations that emerged in Britain and the United States as the 
result of the revelations made by Edward Snowden, Morsi’s Government, leading the world’s largest 
democracy, was accused of devising a ‘snooping and spying orgy’ through such policies.64 Such brazen 
activities by the world’s largest democracies sit awkwardly with  suggestions by writers like Haufler 
that the internet’s decentralisation and fluidity restrict efforts to ‘design and implement effective 
regulations through top-down, government-by-government approaches.’65  
India’s attempts to regulate and compartmentalise cyber-‘space’ are further illustrated by the 
new Information Technology Act, obliging all companies wishing to collect data on citizens to do so 
through agreed standards, obtaining consent and privacy policies, influencing standards for data 
retention and processing within national boundaries.66 Considering India’s command of 43% of the 
global business outsourcing for the Information Technology sector, the Indian intervention is 
significant, with a potential future global impact. This stands in contrast not only to the libertarian 
presentation of an ethereal space, but also to neoliberal assertions that ‘frontiers are irrelevant to 
electronic flows and marketing,’67 a growing body of evidence suggests that ‘walled gardens’ may be 
emerging across the ‘global commons’ of cyberspace, somewhat removed from visions of a ‘place for 
enacting dreams of freedom’.68  
BRICS nations are also pushing back against the cloud. Mandating the storage of Brazilian data 
on its own servers in response to the Snowden affair, Brazil’s approach to data sovereignty stands in 
direct contrast with those who champion the emergence of the global ‘data-cloud’ as undermining 
hierarchical control of data by states and the confirming rise of the global corporates.69 Similarly, the 
BRICS’ signing of the Final Acts of the World Conference on International Telecommunications in 
2012 and preference for localisation of data sovereignty extends this point, standing in explicit 
opposition to Western hesitancy towards ‘erecting Schengen zones for data.’70 Drawing on Foucault, 
Jeremy Crampton argues that the very ‘mapping’ of cyberspace is imbued with competition, adding that 
this ‘space’ has been ‘made’ or ascribed meaning through the application of boundaries/territories by 
the powerful. In doing so, this ‘space’ has been socially constructed and understood in ways that echo 
the understanding of the physical world.71 
Does this potentially mean the end of the world-wide-web? The information and 
communications industry have been quick to note the importance of these developments. Writing in 
2015, Microsoft’s Eric Schmidt identified what he called the emergence of the ‘Splinternet:’ in other 
words different cyberspaces which fit remarkably well onto the old political maps of nation-states. He 
insists that the ‘Web has become a battleground for wars initiated by States.’72 Rather than a global, 
trans-national ‘space’ of freedom, cyberspace is instead increasingly intertwined with, and constrained 
by, the complexities of territorial politics.  
While the role and agency of powerful states like America, Russia and China are often 
discussed as examples of illegitimate attempts by nations to infiltrate cyberspace, they are at best, the 
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tip of the cyber iceberg.73 Academic experts researching the secretive world of cyberweapons not only 
assert their long history but also their proliferation. In the last decade, states of all sizes have entered 
the field, often with parallel programmes in different departments and ministries of the same 
government. Like any new weapon, its very ‘newness’ brings with it prestige, resources and funding. 
Poltain and Wright consider this idea, identifying a spectrum of approaches adopted by states to control 
data generated in and passing through their territories in a way that establishes a form of ‘data 
sovereignty.’74 Indeed, their work similarly supports the earlier argument regarding the importance of 
the physical architecture of cyberspace, again identified as a key pillar of national defence and 
security.75  
Military lawyers such as Franzese have confidently asserted the rapid securitization of 
cyberspace. Used for everything from intelligence gathering and analysis and military plans to probing 
networks for their strategic advantage it is now the fifth domain of warfare. Drawing comparisons with 
other ‘domains of statecraft’ like air and space, cyber becomes a sovereign utility, used for the 
advancement of national security. For Franzese, as with new technologies of air and sea that challenged 
pre-existing legal and social frameworks in similar ways, ‘a regime of Sovereignty’ should be 
established, encouraging States to ‘recognise cyberspace is a sovereign domain and to develop the 
technical capability to exert their sovereignty in cyberspace.’76 By doing so he argues, the silence that 
currently dominates aggressive state activity in cyber-space may reduce, establishing rules of 
‘acceptable State behaviour’ in this domain. Before doing so, we need to reflect on this behaviour’s 
historic legacy, seen in its broader context. Ultimately, the historic ability of States to gain strategic 
advantage through cyber technologies contradicts both the global commons and deterministic neoliberal 
narratives about diminished states.  
 
 
 
Arab Spring: A Cyber Trojan-horse?   
What of claims about cyberspace accelerating social movements and civil society?77 Emphasising the 
effect of global free communications, many still argue that the most significant and meaningful impact 
of cyberspace is the way it allows individuals to bypass oppressive regimes, acting and organising 
rapidly and covertly to bewilder security agencies.  Sociologist Manuel Castells is one of the most 
prominent proponents of this view, and over the last twenty years, his vision of a ‘networked society’ 
has been hugely influential. He has emphasised the impact of the individualisation of cyberspace, 
destabilizing the nation-state’s legitimizing institutions. Moving in sympathy with the libertarian ideal 
of cyberspace, Castells suggests the resultant effects included the opening of global markets and the 
further weakening of the nation-state.78 In the 1990s, enthusiasm for communications technologies as a 
means of spreading democracy informed many aspects of US foreign policy and indeed notions of soft 
power.79 
The Arab Spring re-energised this logic, giving vivid examples of the way that cyberspace, and 
in particular social media platforms like Twitter, were advancing freedom in the Middle East. Key 
figures leading the revolutions in the Maghreb, also in Egypt, Yemen and Bahrain seemed to be adept 
in the use of digital technologies and had been deliberately upskilled by NGOs. Similarly, YouTube 
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and other video archiving platforms allowed citizen journalists, together with exiles and refugees, to 
communicate through mobile phones, cameras and consumer electronics, broadcasting and operating 
independently to both state boundaries and traditional political parties. 80 In 2013, Philip Howard and 
Muzammil Hussain argued in their influential book Democracy’s Fourth Wave? for the liberating effect 
of cyberspace and social media. Authoritarian leaders, they insisted, were crippled by an army of ‘20 
and 30 year-olds without ideological baggage, violent intentions or clear leadership.81 In contrast to 
previous media forms like the printing press and the radio, the peer-to-peer components of cyberspace 
offered a platform to ‘organise, build networks, and create social capital and political action.’82 
Following the immolation of Mohammed Bouazizi in Libya, their analysis found social media (notably 
Facebook/Twitter) to have been pivotal in disseminating information and raising awareness, ‘putting a 
human face on political oppression.’83  
Yet almost a decade on, these optimistic conclusions stand in need of some qualification. 
Scholars are now less convinced of the catalytic effect of social media on these events. Moreover, during 
the last decade, we have seen Middle Eastern governments gradually recover control over their 
territories. Importantly, cyberspace has remained central to this resurgence. Like China, Russia, Brazil 
and India, they have used this strategic technology to ‘censor, surveil, and disrupt protesters and to 
actively cultivate alternative nationalist movements using ‘bots’ and armies of fake users’. Ironically 
the technologies that many academics saw as vehicles of liberation, have now been revealed as 
squashing civil society. Where they have not mastered the internet, they have simply shut it down, 
blocking encrypted communications.84 Therefore, while social media and networked technology can 
facilitate community and social organisation, they simultaneously offer sovereign states new ways of 
asserting or extending their control and authority. At their most extreme, Dana Moss has shown how 
authoritarian governments can use the internet to pursue their own diaspora abroad.  Internet 
communication technologies can in fact globalize social control by regimes and impact anti-regime 
diasporas. Syria has successfully used these techniques to deter many from using the internet to contest 
the Assad regime.85 
In April 2017, the Turkish Government turned to these electronic forms of statecraft. They 
restricted common platforms like Wikipedia, social media and even dating sites following the 
assassination of the Russian Ambassador to Turkey.  Fearing they were losing virtual control of their 
citizens, the government acted swiftly and concisely, cutting off access to swathes of the population, as 
if to remind their populous of their underlying ability to influence these ‘free’ spaces.86 In contrast to 
the ‘liberation technology’ narrative, Rod and Weidmann highlight the instrumental, strategic value of 
internet technology for government agencies connected to processes of surveillance, monitoring and 
control. Having conducted a large-N analyses of authoritarian countries for the years 1993–2010 they 
concluded firstly that ‘regimes aiming to prevent any independent public sphere are more likely to 
introduce the Internet’. They also suggest that their findings indicate that the internet has did not 
contribute to a global shift towards democracy during this period.87  
Rather than liberating, social media platforms become an additional layer of bureaucracy and 
control. Applying for licenses and collecting data on the viewing histories of their citizens, internet-
related technology thus becomes indicative of government presence and surveillance. Propagating 
‘correct values’ and identifying domestic opposition movements, this directly challenges the liberation 
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narrative. This is a significant intervention, at a time when social media and other platforms are under 
intense scrutiny for conceding to requests from suspect government organisations. Consequently, 
despite the temptation and allure of the libertarian narrative of individual empowerment, governments 
remain able to affect Net transaction costs, applying filters, cyber-fences and other mechanisms to 
effectively regulate Net transactions.88 As Daniel  Drezner concludes, despite its promise and potential 
for liberation, ‘when necessary, governments of every stripe have been willing to disrupt or sever 
internet traffic in order to ensure that their ends are achieved.’89  
Perhaps Rod and Weidman’s most significant contribution is their suggestion that it is precisely 
this networking potential that creates an ‘incentive for control’ for autocratic elites, concerned with 
containing public sentiment and opinion, with 82% (28/34) of countries studied having some form of 
internet censorship or other.90 Graham also explores this idea, arguing that we must ‘debunk the 
substitution-ist myths of technological determinism… allowing us to reveal the socially contingent 
effects of new technologies… and ways in which some groups, areas and interests may benefit… while 
others actually lose out.’91 Therefore, while cyberspace enables individuals to communicate across 
national boundaries, the freedom and privacy they experience is often illusory. The platforms through 
which social movements (and other organisations) operate remain embedded within broader systems of 
hierarchy and centralisation, predominantly connected to physicality and territory.  
There is also little question that states have sought to exaggerate the extent to which privacy 
technology provides protesters and insurgents with effective cloaking in the expectation that this will 
yield more data. Indeed, one of the main vexations that American intelligence officers expressed with 
the Snowden revelations was that individuals were suddenly apprised of this state capability.92 In 2003, 
it was noticeable that the US occupation forces in Baghdad gave the population a modern mobile phone 
network even before restoring water and medical services, since this allowed them to gather intelligence 
on the insurgents who used it.93 If engaged in a long-term struggle, the internet is potentially a trap for 
social movements, since it strips away the very anonymity that protesters and rebels have historically 
required to survive. Reliant on apps, platforms and other electronic tools that remain embedded within 
the ‘global network,’ that allocates everyone a number, often their IP address. Cyberspace may give the 
protester short-term ‘flash mob’ advantage, but over time it probably tips the balance of advantage back 
in favour of the security forces of Sovereign states. In the wake of the Snowden revelations, we need to 
ask whether there has ever been a time in which major states have ceded authority over this 
environment, while minor states seem to have caught up relatively quickly.94 What we have seen over 
the last decade points not so much to anarchy but instead to the growing ability of sovereign entities to 
utilise cyberspace for their strategic advantage, often in secret. Meanwhile, their warnings about 
electronic ‘anarchy’ validate controversial policies that may otherwise have been rejected by their 
parliaments and populations.  
 
 
Longer Histories of Involvement 
Perhaps the most fundamental misconception of our understanding of the relationship between 
cyberspace and sovereignty is a perception of newness. Historicising these issues, as well as grounding 
them in geography, is important if we are to fully appreciate the long-term use of cyberspace by 
sovereign states for their strategic advantage. Sovereignty has been fortified, not eradicated, under 
globalising conditions.95 To date, the International Relations literature has not only conformed mostly 
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to the myth of libertarian romanticism, it has tended to analyse state interventions in this realm as 
surprising, episodic or untypical. Arguably this interpretation, which often commands considerable 
consensus, stands in need of adjustment.96   
More than a century ago, the infosphere formed a central tool of state advantage. Military 
communications and technical surveillance practices across the globe, beginning with the telegraph, 
were adopted and exploited by states to exercise control and also increase warning in an era of 
increasing strategic mobility. Indeed, historians have described the telegraph as the ‘Victorian 
internet.’97 The electronic intelligence revolution that many associate with Alan Turing and Bletchley 
Park had in fact mostly arrived by 1918. As Dan Larsen has demonstrated, these surveillance activities 
were conducted in strikingly similar ways during the First World War as during the Second World 
War.98 States exerted their influence across cable networks that were prized geographical assets and 
legacies of empire. Companies like Cable & Wireless Ltd worked closely Whitehall in the much the 
same way as British Telecom has done in the current century. Radio masts and listening stations were 
established across the globe and the desire to intercept or manipulate these transmissions for reason of 
intelligence or propaganda has often inspired larger states to cling to small islands in obscure parts of 
the world in what appear to be time-warp remnants of empire.99 These physical structures expanded and 
changed with the arrival of microwave telephone networks, mobile phone networks, 
telecommunications satellites and finally fibre optic cables. While the technology advanced, their 
critical importance to states did not waver.100 
The increasing volumes of data intercepted by the intelligence agencies have indirectly driven 
the development many of the devices that now surround us. In particular, the vast increase in the volume 
of intercepted diplomatic traffic from third world countries by the 1960s drove the demand for high-
speed computing from companies such as IBM and specialist contractors such as Cray Corporation. 
Directly or indirectly, by the 1980s, organisations like the NSA employed vast number of computing 
PhDs from universities and as one of the foremost historians of computing has observed, we have yet 
to tell the real story about the history of computing.101 Moreover, the boundless volume of intercepted 
clear voice traffic grabbed by the signals intelligence agencies after 1960 also drove an entire field of 
advanced linguistic computer translation and computer voice recognition.  Computing as a whole is 
perhaps ten years further advanced because of these defence-driven applications, moreover, devices 
such as Amazon Alexa or Google Mini now appearing in our homes, have their origins in research 
commissioned by NSA and GCHQ.102    
 While for many, the networks and ‘clouds’ that comprise cyberspace are unrelated to historic 
practices, they are intrinsically connected.103 Incorporating these into a longitudinal analysis illustrates 
the ways cyberspace has been used by states as a central tool of statecraft. Indeed, it is probably worth 
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remembering that the internet itself was an outgrowth of American military science research.104 
Established in the late 1960s by the National Science Foundation, ARPA quickly expanded on a global 
scale, enabling governments and military apparatuses to conduct a range of government business, 
including major nuclear and naval technology projects more efficiently. Although many argue that the 
ARPANET bears little resemblance to the cyberspace of today, we need to recognise that its foundations 
were laid by the Pentagon.105 Super-computing and the internet both lack a single founding father 
because they emerged out of a myriad of advanced defence projects.106 
With this comes boundaries, labels, designators and order. A compelling example is the little-
known Domain Naming System (DNS), hierarchically allocating names and IP addresses to new 
‘entrants’ of cyberspace. Viewed by many as a neutral, technical matter of limited political relevance, 
DeNardis has nevertheless explored the political underpinnings of this system, echoing Bratton’s (and 
Foucault’s) claim that an ability to address something means you can govern it.107 Despite superficial 
impressions of trans-nationalism and unfettered freedom, every e-mail and website address is attached 
to and aligned with a physical territory. Allocated hierarchically, Domain names like ‘.fr’ (France) and 
‘.co.uk’ (UK) connect a user or company with a territorial place. They connect them to a sovereign 
state. McDowell, Steinberg and Tomasello highlight the broader issue of Government’s ‘managing’ of 
the Internet in these ways, showing how actors construct the ‘infosphere’ to ‘achieve specific ends.’108 
While a determined user can certainly employ time-consuming techniques to mask their identity online, 
most websites and internet users are reliant upon these structures to engage with and use internet 
technologies. For the majority of communications and transactions the idea that the internet escapes a 
location is implausible.109  
 Thus, the history and geography of cyberspace cannot be properly understood without a 
reinterpretation of its connections to its material foundations and reliance upon sovereign states. Many 
social scientists and policymakers remain persuaded of the libertarian portrayal of cyberspace as 
weakening centralised power and control. Others have assumed that governments have only recently 
begun to re-assert control over what they assumed to be an anarchic space. This is perhaps 
understandable since so much of the history or surveillance and indeed computing generally contain 
missing elements that historians will be trying to unpick for decades to come.110 But we now know 
enough to conclude that this technology probably reinforces traditional hierarchies, making the more 
powerful states like Russia, China and the United States yet stronger.111 
 
 
Conclusion 
Cyberspace has consistently been used as a tool of statecraft. Although electronic ‘space’ has become 
increasingly important for a range of activities, from storage to communication, territorial ‘place’ 
remains prevalent. Temporality is equally important, not only in understanding the significance of the 
development of this physical infrastructure over time, but also in appreciating that many technical 
innovations were driven by the supreme efforts that security researchers exerted to stay ahead of the 
curve in this realm. The United States as an information hegemon, and more specifically the National 
Security Agency, has done more than many suspect to shape the current information environment. 
Meanwhile, smaller states have taken a little while to catch up and achieve purchase over new systems. 
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As the Arab Spring illustrates, this can wrong-foot regimes in the short term, but in the long term there 
is every sign that states are back in control.  
What is most striking about the role of states and sovereignty in cyberspace is that often this 
interest is itself bounded. In striking contrast to our vision of cyberspace as global, governments appear 
to privilege internal control and authority, and so are less concerned with directly challenging the 
activity of other nations in cyberspace than with establishing control within national jurisdictions. 
Indian and Brazilian pursuit of ‘data sovereignty’ amongst the BRICS nations could be viewed 
accordingly, with new regulations promulgated that appear to challenge the globalisation of 
telecommunications. Even major cities like Los Angeles are paying higher fees to ensure that their data 
is stored locally and not in the cloud. The emerging ‘splinternet’ is a global phenomenon and not just 
about China, Russia or Iran.  
The true rebels in cyberspace were figures like computer hacktivist Kevin Mitnick who devoted 
his life to evading the rules and believed that cyberspace provided a secret playground, but his eventual 
destination was a penitentiary.  Hackers and cyber criminals enjoy sanctuary in locations such as North 
Korea and the Balkans, but even here their immunity depends on the world of states, either ‘pariahs’ or 
places with poor governance.112  Social scientists might well devote more attention to the material, 
geographical underpinnings of cyberspace. While libertarian, anarchic representations are attractive, 
especially to politicians and policy-maker rolling out new regulation, they often overlook the role and 
significance of physical geography and sovereign power. More importantly, they underappreciate (if 
not misrepresent) the historic and enduring ability of sovereign entities to influence and manipulate this 
‘new’ environment for their advantage.  
While this analysis is on one level pessimistic, there remains room for optimism. Understood 
as the product of social relations, cyberspace has the potential to change. It is not that cyberspace has 
and will always be used as a tool for oppression, eradicating its usefulness for social movements and 
other liberating forces. It is, in the words of Doreen Massey, ‘unfinished,’ always being made and 
recreated. How this ‘space’ develops remains unknown and unconfirmed. Recognising the historic and 
underlying political relations that led up to its current existence is significant if we are to understand its 
future.  
Perhaps the most compelling illustration of the connections between cyberspace and 
sovereignty were made not by political scientists, but by Trevor Paglen, an American artist whose work 
tackles mass surveillance and data collection.  Using geography and satellite imagery, Paglen 
masterfully depicts the physical, material presence of the surveillance state. Doing so, he suggests that 
‘infrastructures of power always inhabit the surface of the earth somehow, or the skies above the earth. 
‘They're material things, always, and even though the metaphors we use to describe them are often 
immaterial - for example, we might describe the internet as the Cloud or cyber-space - those metaphors 
are wildly misleading.’113 Building on the argument here and echoing the long-overlooked appeals of 
geographers, he shows how state secrecy and surveillance are produced through space.114 
A more material approach also requires stronger attention to history and less emphasis on 
‘newness’. We might question approaches that emphasise the revolutionary impact of cyberspace that 
frequently results in overblown claims of transformation. Understood in connection to or with similar 
technologies of telephony and printing, the perennial nature of debates surrounding the relationship 
between ‘place’ and ‘space’ and the relationship between social transformation and technology emerges 
in a longer perspective.  More importantly, a more measured approach allows us to reappraise the 
meaning of the Snowden revelations on surveillance and state hacking. Widely acclaimed as the high 
water-mark of Western surveillance, most discussions of current electronic spying practices are 
attended by hyperbole, being treated as exceptional or ahistorical. However, this article suggests the 
possibility that sovereign entities of all stripes have historically recognised the strategic value of 
exploiting cyberspace for their advantage all the way back to Bletchley Park. As James Bridle has 
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shown, Snowden’s so-called revelations were in fact on a continuum with other insights into 
surveillance over decades, if not centuries. States have always been in control of communications and 
there is less disorder in this space than we have been led to believe.115 This absence of anarchy is either 
rather reassuring or rather worrying, depending on our point of view. 
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